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Economic Reforms in Cuba and the United States:
Sure, I CAN Invest … but Should I?
By: Andrew C. Adair
April 25, 2015
To say that the recent developments in the U.S. – Cuba relationship will lead to
more investment on the island is a dramatic understatement. Indeed, each step taken
by the country’s leaders represents a historic step forwards on the long march to
normalization of relations and open trade. However, the slew of positive developments
to this date are limited to surface level concerns that, while important changes to make,
do not do enough to legitimize investment in Cuba. In this way, the positive
developments resemble internal reforms in Cuba designed to attract foreign investment
that put Band-Aids on gushing wounds. Absent from recent discussions, for example,
are efforts to enhance government transparency, as well as structural reforms to Cuba’s
legal system.
For our purposes, it is important to distinguish between types of investment.
Some firms want higher risk and seek out investments in developing countries to
capitalize on uncertain environments and generate higher returns. 1 Mainstream
investors are generally more risk averse and are unable to hedge against increased
risk. Cuba is not ready for these investors yet. This paper begins by explaining the

1

See, e.g., Tom Herzfeld, Interview: A Glimpse into the Future of the U.S. Private
Investment in Cuba, Wharton: Knowledge, available online at
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/the-future-of-us-private-investment-in-cuba/
(Mar. 13, 2015) (“We’re looking for returns in excess of what people would make in private
ventures and more plain-vanilla investments. And we want the risk. People who are
investing with us are willing to take the risk. We want that risk.”).

significance of recent developments in relations between the two countries, as well as
some obstacles to further developments. Part II juxtaposes internal reforms in Cuba
with some of the major obstacles discouraging investment in Cuba. Part III discusses
the use of risk assessments by invstors, and notes that Cuba’s risk is still fairly high. In
sum, the positive developments during the last few years effectively make it legal for
U.S. companies to invest in Cuba. But Cuba still has a long way to go to make its
business climate attractive to such investment.
I.

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE U.S. – CUBA RELATIONSHIP
The recent push by Barack Obama and Raul Castro to normalize relations

between their two countries generated widespread attention in the financial press. The
attention is warranted: these efforts paved the way for future investment in Cuba by
eliminating several important barriers. This section will examine the reforms in waves,
focusing first on those announced in 2009, those announced in 2014, and then the most
recent reforms announced this year. The section will conclude by pointing to political
hurdles that may complicate the next wave of reforms.
A. 2009 Reforms
The first 100 days of President Obama’s presidency featured an aggressive shift
in policy with regards to Cuba. By executive action, the President lifted travel
restrictions related to family visits and certain cultural exchanges, and authorized the
remittance of financial and other resources to Cuba by family members. The changes
also sought to enhance telecommunications links between the two countries.2 These

See The White House: Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Reaching Out to the
Cuban People (Apr. 13, 2009), available online at
2

2

changes, while limited in scope, provided an important signal to potential investors that
the U.S. was diverting from the policy of isolating Cuba and its people. It also signaled
an effort to change the dynamic between the two countries after Raul Castro took
leadership.
The effects of this policy are clear. In 2012, the number of U.S. tourists to visit
Cuba was twice the number of visitors in 2007, and this does not count more than
350,000 Cuban-Americans permitted to visit Cuba in 2012 under the new regulations.3
Since 2012, those numbers have continued to increase at a dramatic pace. In addition,
Americans have responded to Obama’s allowance of remittances by sending significant
sums of money to Cuban family members. Many people that we spoke with in Cuba
noted that remittances from the U.S. provide a higher income than anything you can
earn from the government. Those anecdotes are real. It is estimated that up to $3
billion per year is remitted to family members in Cuba. If divided evenly among the
entire Cuban population, that would amount to about $272 per person.4 By comparison,
the average Cuban earns around $200 per year. This comparison is striking. Indeed,
some Cubans even used the remittances to open businesses and purchase homes. By
giving more Americans the chance to visit Cuba and allowing the transfer of capital
from America to Cuba, President Obama’s initiatives opened the door for business
opportunities on the island.

https://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Fact-Sheet-Reaching-out-to-the-Cubanpeople/.

See Marc Frank, “Americans traveling to Cuba in record numbers,” USA TODAY (Oct.
18, 2013), available online at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/18/us-cuba-usatourism-idUSBRE99H0J320131018.
3
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See Judith Miller, “Cuba on the Edge,” DEPARTURES 201, 202 (May/June 2015).
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B. 2014 Reforms
Following a chilling period between the two nations spurned by the
imprisonment of Alan Gross, President Obama’s December 2014 announcements
presented sweeping changes in the relationship between the two countries. These
announcements included notice that the State Department would begin the process of
reestablishing diplomatic ties with Cuba, a further easing of travel restrictions, an
increase to the permissible remittance levels, a loosening of the import/export rules of
Cuban goods, and the allowance of authorized transactions between the U.S. and Cuba.
These reforms have already had a significant effect and will continue to do so.
The increased access of Cubans to Americans and American money means
increased opportunity for the private sector. A lack of available financing for private
ventures limits the possibilities of the ventures, but the 400 percent increase in
remittance levels means more money from the U.S. can enter Cuba to finance these
ventures.5 Moreover, although Cuban entrepreneurs faced a lack a market for goods
and services, increased tourism and relaxed rules for imports and exports will increase
demand. Increased access to capital combined with increased demand for goods is a
favorable recipe for development of private enterprises in Cuba.
The effort to reestablish diplomatic relations between the countries revolves
around the reopening of embassies in Havana and Washington, D.C. There are very
tangible benefits to turning the Interests Section in Havana into a full-fledged embassy,
but the significance to investors would be mostly symbolic. A U.S. embassy in Cuba

Pavel Vidal Alejandro, “The Cuban Economy and Obama’s New Policy,” ONCUBA
(Feb. 12, 2015), available online at http://oncubamagazine.com/economy-business/thecuban-economy-and-obamas-new-policy/.
5
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means that the change in tone between the two countries is permanent and that
enhanced trade opportunities are legitimate in spite of lingering sanctions. It also will
give the U.S. a platform from which to advocate for its business interests should the
need arise.6
C. 2015 Reforms
The most significant reform so far this year was President Obama’s decision to
trigger the removal of Cuba from the State Department’s Terrorism List.7 This removed
a major hurdle in negotiations to the establishment of an embassy, and symbolically,
creates some distance between Cuba from the three states remaining on the list: Syria,
Sudan, and Iran.
The reform also makes a significant difference for U.S. financial institutions
considering doing business in Cuba. Though not prohibited, engaging in transactions
with countries on the terrorism list demanded costly compliance mechanisms and
tolerance of significant risk. 8 Simply put, the costs of complying with government
regulations were not met by the upside of transacting in Cuba. This dramatically

Nick Miroff, “The U.S. and Cuba will soon agree to reopen their embasses. Here’s what
happens next.” THE WASHINGTON POST (Apr. 14, 2015), available online at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2015/04/10/the-u-s-and-cuba-willsoon-agree-to-reopen-their-embassies-heres-what-happens-next/.
6

See Karen DeYoung, “Obama removes Cuba from the list of state sponsors of
terrorism,” THE WASHINGTON POST (Apr. 14, 2015), available online at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-removes-cuba-from-the-listof-state-sponsors-of-terrorism/2015/04/14/8f7dbd2e-e2d9-11e4-81ea0649268f729e_story.html. The process involves the President’s recommendation to
Congress, followed by a 45-day period during which Congress can pass a joint resolution
opposing the move. It is unlikely that such an effort will succeed.
7

Karl Vic, “Obama’s Move to Drop Cuba From Terror List Sets Up Showdown With
Congress,” TIME (Apr. 14, 2015), available online at http://time.com/3821558/obama-cubaterror-list-congress-showdown/.
8
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hindered the access to capital and financial markets for Cubans, and even denied access
to bank accounts for Cuban diplomats in Washington.9 When the change is effected and
Cuba is removed from the list, U.S. financial institutions will be able to remove this
risk from their assessments and will likely begin to transact more frequently in Cuba.
Other benefits include more freedom for businesses to negotiate trade deals, increased
access for Cubans to loans from international organizations such as the World Bank,
and the ability to process credit and debit card transactions in Cuba. The USA Today
aptly described that as a result of this move, the floodgates are now open.10
D. Political Opposition: what’s left?
The U.S. and Cuba are on the path to normalization of relations, but thus far,
every change by the U.S. government has been by executive action. Much of the
opposition from Republican legislators stems from Cuba’s unsatisfactory record on
human rights. According to House Speaker John Boehner, the Obama Administration’s
efforts to normalize relations amounts to rewarding the Castro regime despite a “clear
record of repression at home and exporting violence throughout the region.” The
Speaker further condemned the moves, explaining that “[c]ozying up to [an] oppressive

Randal C. Archibold and Julie Hisrchfeld Davis, “Cuba to Be Removed From U.S. List
of Nations That Sponsor Terrorism,” THE NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 14, 2015), available
online at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/15/world/americas/obama-cuba-remove-fromstate-terror-list.html?_r=0.
9

Alan Gomez, “First Take: With Cuba off terror list, floodgates open,” USA TODAY
(Apr. 14, 2015), available online at
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/04/14/first-take-cuba-obama-statesponsors-of-terrorism/25777625/.
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regime in Cuba is a blow to all who long for liberty and dignity.”11 This vociferous
dissent to the President’s policy may stifle ability to take further steps.
One of those steps would be the full repeal of the embargo. Most of the reforms
addressed above reflect an easing of the embargo’s restrictions. Indeed, the President
has significant room to implement the various laws that constitute the embargo,
including flexibility over sanctions on Cuba. However, its full repeal requires an act of
Congress.
Congress may also use other tools to halt the movement toward normalization of
relations with Cuba. Focusing specifically on the establishment of an embassy,
Republican Senators have suggested two ways they can get in the way. The first is to
prevent the appointment of an ambassador by blocking a confirmation vote in the
Senate. Wary of taking steps that may perpetuate the power of the Castro regime,
Senator Marco Rubio pledged to “do everything within the rules of the Senate to
prevent [a nominee for Ambassador to Cuba] from ever even coming up for a vote.”12
Senator Rubio and others have also pledged to use their power over appropriations to
block funding for the U.S. Embassy, effectively denying the embassy’s ability to
operate.13 The effectiveness of such tools is unclear, however, it is apparent that some
members of Congress will strive to impede efforts to further normalize relations.

Speaker Boehner’s Press Office, “A Blow to All Who Long for Freedom” (Apr. 14,
2015), available online at http://www.speaker.gov/press-release/blow-all-who-long-freedom.
11

Alexandra Jaffe, “Rubio pledges to block vote on Cuban ambassador,” CNN (Dec. 17,
2014), available online at http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/17/politics/marco-rubio-block-cubanominee/.
12

Id. See also Rebecca Shabad, “Graham: Block funds for US embassy in Cuba,” THE
HILL (Dec. 17, 2014), available online at http://thehill.com/policy/finance/227426-gopsenator-threatens-to-block-us-funds-to-open-embassy-in-cuba.
13
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In sum, the Obama Administration has taken a number of steps to open up the
opportunity for Americans to invest in Cuba. By easing travel restrictions, opening up
access to capital, moving towards establishing embassies, and removing Cuba from the
State Sponsors of Terrorism List, the Obama Administration effectively made investing
and doing business in Cuba possible. That however does not address concerns that
Cuba’s climate is unripe for investment. The next section will focus on missed
opportunities by Cuba to make structural reforms necessary for attracting investment.
II.

INTERNAL REFORMS IN CUBA AND MISSED OPPORTUNITIES
When Raul Castro came to power in Cuba, he seemed to bring with him a desire

to reform Cuba’s economic system. That desire manifested itself, and Cuba’s economy
left communism for what appears to be a hybrid capitalist-socialist model. Chief among
these reforms were sweeping changes to the opportunities available to Cuban citizens.
Those changes include the opportunity to get licenses for trade and to establish
privately operated businesses, such as restaurants. These small business owners are
among the first Cubans to pay taxes since the revolution. Discussions with Paladar
owners indicated that it is a difficult business to be in, but that being in business was
better than settling for a state-provided salary. While these reforms to the Cuban
system are monumental, the efforts made to attract foreign investment fall short of
having such a great impact. This section first examines reforms that Cuba made and
then describes the areas that it should have focused its efforts on instead.

8

A. Reforms that Cuba Made
In March 2014, Cuba’s National Assembly enacted reforms designed to attract
foreign investment in Cuba. These reforms included a delay and reduction in the profits
tax for joint ventures with the Cuban government.14 The law also reduces taxes on
labor costs, permits complete foreign ownership, allows investment in new sectors
including real estate, recognizes intellectual property rights of investors, and more.15
These reforms also included important guarantees by the government designed to
increase investment security. However, those guarantees, much like the law’s other
measures, were hollow. The primary reason being that they provide for the
expropriation of a foreign investor’s assets if it is in the public utility or social
interest. 16 Moreover, the tax breaks only apply to joint ventures which require the
investor to take a 49 percent stake to the government’s 51 percent—an implicit tax
because it denies foreign investors the opportunity to control their investments.
Later last year, the Cuban government released a catalog of domestic projects
that are ripe for foreign investment. The list’s release was significant in that it provided
expansive information for foreign investors, but it also made very clear that despite the
invitation to invest, “Cuba will remain a state-driven economy dominated by large
government holding companies and the authorities will dictate the direction and pace of

Daniel Trotta, “Cuba approves law aimed at attracting foreign investment,”
REUTERS (Mar. 29, 2014), available online at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/29/us-cuba-investment-idUSBREA2S0EJ20140329.
14

“What the New Cuban Foreign Investment Law Means,” LAW360 (Aug. 11, 2014),
available online at
http://www.foxrothschild.com/newspubs/newspubsArticle.aspx?id=15032395156.
15

Id. Even though the expropriation requires indemnification, it depends upon the
actions of an unreliable government.
16
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change.”17 Notable examples that should temper the enthusiasm that foreign investors
have for recent changes abound. In the tourism sector, Cuba outlined 21 potential hotel
construction projects and 33 requests for new management contracts at state-owned
hotels. But the Cubans did not invite foreign investors to take leadership in the best
tourism opportunities, such as for hotels in Havana.18 In the agricultural sector, the
Cuban government invited investment in several commodities, but prohibited
participation in the profitable cigar industry, and severely limited participation in the
sugar industry.19 Cuba invited investment in its energy sector, but requires investors to
sell output to the state’s distribution systems at pre-fixed prices. Cuba also established
a Free Trade Zone in Mariel, but development on the port is slow due to inadequate
sites and a lack of connections to utilities.20 The Brookings Institute summed up the
catalog by noting that firms must guarantee foreign markets, that the Cuban
government will discriminate between home countries, that privatization of state-held
enterprises is prohibited, and that foreign investors may not partner with private
enterprise in Cuba.21
These two examples of incentives designed to attract foreign investment in Cuba
make clear that Cuba is not going far enough. Although the Obama Administration
made investment possible, the Cuban government has largely failed to create a

Richard Feinberg, “Cuba’s Foreign Investment Invitation: Insights into Internal
Struggles,” Brookings Institute: Up Front (Nov. 21, 2014), available online at
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2014/11/21-cuba-foreign-investmentfeinberg.
17

18

Id.

19

Id.

20

Id.

21

Feinberg, “Cuba’s Foreign Investment Invitation: Insights into Internal Struggles.”
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favorable business climate. Doing so requires more than tax incentives and the
availability of projects: it requires structural reforms.
B. Reforms that Cuba Needs
Cuba clearly recognizes the need for an influx in foreign capital, but appears to
want to bring more foreign investment to the island without changing the way it
operates. Changing dynamics between Cuba and the U.S. will certainly make a
difference, however, companies in many countries have been able to invest in Cuba for
years and have generally not done so. Indeed, the hesitation to invest reflects a lack of
confidence in the Cuban legal system and government transparency. Therefore,
enhancing the rule of law and government transparency would go along way towards
attracting investment to Cuba.
A number of studies have concluded that judicial strength and the rule of law are
critical for attracting foreign investment, including studies focused specifically on Latin
America.22 This is not surprising: investment depends on the ability to assess risk, but
investors cannot properly assess the risk that they face unless can predict the
challenges. A stable legal system guided by the rule of law means that investors can
predict where the hurdles will be and how they can overcome them. At its core, the
legitimate rule of law means that an investor’s rights are protected and that it can seek
remedies for wrongs. Stories of government interference in business interests,
imprisonment of agents of foreign investors, and uncertain access to the legal system
diminish the credibility of Cuba’s incentives to foreign investors. To increase capital

See Joseph L. Staats and Glen Biglaiser, “Foreign Direct Investment in Latin
America: The Importance of Judicial Strength and Rule of Law,” 56 Int’l Studies Qtly 193,
193 (Mar. 2012).
22
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destined for Cuba, the government should make establishment of rule of law a top
priority.
A lack of government transparency likewise contributes to the hesitation to
invest in Cuba. According to the World Trade Organization, “transparency in economic
policy-making and in the activities of the government institutions is vital in attracting
foreign investment.”23 The organization pointed to a number of reasons why a lack of
transparency hinders foreign investment: increased costs, difficulty accessing
information for cross-border transactions, unsatisfactory protection of property rights,
negative effect on business attitudes, and an inability to generate favorable conditions
for capital inflows.24
Transparency International measures transparency in countries across the
world, but it does not feature a measurement for Cuba.25 This suggests such a lack of
transparency that it cannot even be measured. Personal interactions and observations
in Cuba likewise made painfully clear that transparency does not exist in Cuba. The
first sign of the lack of transparency was the refusal to allow us to meet with
government officials while in Havana. Consistent requests were rebuffed. University
professors bragged about the quality of the education system, but requests to see an
exam were likewise rebuffed. Lectures focused on the operation of the Cuban legal
system in theory, but requests for descriptions of how it worked in practice were

Economic Research and Analytics Division, “The Impact of Transparency on Foreign
Direct Investment,” Working Paper, World Trade Organization 3 (Nov. 2001), available
online at https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/erad-99-02.doc.
23
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Id. at 4-6.

See Transparency International: Corruption by Country/Territory, available online at
http://www.transparency.org/country#CUB.
25
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rebuffed. The lack of transparency also showed in conversations with U.S. diplomats in
Cuba, who protested that the Cuban government refused to share information
regarding how it calculated key economic indicators such as Gross Domestic Product.
But these denials of transparency to foreigners pale in comparison to that faced by
Cuban citizens.
In a conversation with a political dissident,26 I learned that Cuba has two police
systems: the ordinary police and the secret police, which is guided by the Castro-led
Communist Party. Alex’s story of imprisonment was illustrative. After being arrested,
Alex asked the police why they were arrested. The police said they did not know and
that they did not want to arrest Alex, but that the secret police told them they had to do
it. Alex was not permitted to see a lawyer nor a judge, and did not have visitors until he
was released a few days later. This story matched suspicions related to us by many
Cubans who thought that the secret police was monitoring their movements and
conversations.
The mere fact that Cuba has a police force labeled “secret” demonstrates an
aversion to transparency. That aversion translates to business decisions made by the
government. It is unclear how contracts are awarded and what limits government
agencies face when it comes to the imposition of permit requirements. Discussions with
a small business owner in Havana also suggested an excessive and unexpected
regulatory burden that includes multiple layers of tax payments, inspections, and social
security payments. In order to foster a business climate ripe for foreign investment,
Cuba must address this lack of transparency. It also must enhance the rule of law.

26

To protect this person from political retribution, I’ll refer to them as Alex.
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These two changes would be a strong signal to the international community and likely
lead to a dramatic increase in capital entering the island.
III.

RISK ASSESSMENTS
Investing in a foreign jurisdiction raises a number of questions that a domestic

investment does not. For example, profit from foreign investment depends on the ability
to remove capital from that country. Capital transfer depends on the government
mechanisms governing capital flows. Investment in another country also means
submitting your investment to that country’s judicial system. A country incapable of
enforcing judgments in your favor subjects you to risk that contractors and other
parties will take advantage of you. To help investors account for these risks, as well as
political risks such as regime change, many sophisticated parties produce risk
assessments. Risk assessments are tools to evaluate factors that may interfere with the
return on investment in a foreign country.
There are a variety of publicly available risk assessments for Cuba. Michigan
State University’s Broad College of Business gave Cuba and its business climate a D.
The country rating suggests a “high-risk political and economic environment [and that]
corporate default probability is very high.”27 The business climate rating suggests a
very difficult business climate, in part due to unpredictable debt collection.28 Another
risk assessment gave Cuba the riskiest rating for short, medium, and long-term
political risk, special transactions, commercial risk, and transfer risk. Cuba also

Cuba: Risk Assessment, Global Edge, available online at
http://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/cuba/risk (last visited Apr. 24, 2015).
27

28

Id.
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received a high rating for expropriation risk.29 In fact, the transfer risk is so great that
the rater “is reluctant to insure” it. It is also worth noting that none of the factors
mentioned above have been addressed by economic reforms in Cuba. This reinforces the
idea that Cuba’s attractiveness as a place to invest will not increase until the country
addresses the core structural issues that were presented in Part II.
***
Recent developments in relations between Cuba and the United States suggest
that Cuba’s climate is opening to foreign investment. American investors should be
encouraged by the easing of blockade-related restrictions, such as travel bans,
prohibitions on remittance, and Cuba’s place on the State Sponsors of Terrorism List.
Internal reforms in Cuba are also encouraging, however, they do not go far enough to
address the structural concerns of investors. Indeed, these concerns are reflected in risk
assessments conducted to evaluate the likelihood of securing return on investment in
Cuba.
This brings us back to the question posed in this paper’s title: I know that I CAN
invest in Cuba, but should I? The answer to that question depends on your risk
tolerance. But for most investors, the answer is not yet. Cuba has taken several steps in
the right direction by publishing economic data, lowering the tax burden, and
establishing free trade zones. More reform is necessary to dramatically alter the
unfavorable business climate. That said, it is likely that those reforms will come in
time. Part of the changes to U.S. policy focused on increasing access to information for
Country Risks, Delcredere/Ducroire, available online at
http://www.delcredereducroire.be/en/countryrisks/#focusCountry=CU&focusContinent=&filter=TransferRisk&min=0&max=7&tab=1
(last visited Apr. 24, 2015).
29
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Cubans, encouraging travel between the two countries, establishment of NGOs, and
enhancement of political society for Cubans. These reforms could lead to internal
pressure for greater political reform, which could dramatically encourage foreign
investment by strengthening rule of law and increasing transparency.
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